Introduction
The simplest search-theoretic model of monetary exchange endogenizes the acceptability of money, in the sense that there is a pure-strategy equilibrium where money is accepted and another where it is not. When these equilibria coexist there is typically also a mixed-strategy equilibrium where agents accept money with probability ¼ 2 (0; 1) { or, equivalently, an equilibrium where some agents accept it and others do not. 1 In the equilibrium with ¼ 2 (0; 1) we say that money is partially acceptable, or the economy is partially monetized. While the mixed-strategy equilibrium has been used in several applications in the literature (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright [1993] and Soller-Curtis and Waller [2000] ), we argue here that such equilibria should not be taken seriously.
These equilibria arise simply because of the fact that when there are two pure-strategy equilibria generically there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in between, but in the model they make little economic sense. For one thing, they are unstable in a naive but natural sense, and in an evolutionary sense (Wright 1999) . For another, an equilibrium of this sort is really an artifact of the extreme assumption that both goods and money are indivisible, an assumption made for tractability and not for economic content. If either goods or money are divisible these mixed-strategy equilibria do not exist.
Moreover, even if one were to take seriously the notion that goods and money are indivisible { or at least that there may be some other nonconvexities with similar e®ects { if we allow agents to trade lotteries then again the mixedstrategy equilibria do not exist (Berentsen, Molico and Wright [in press] which is derived from the underlying distribution of characteristics, then an equilibrium is simply a solution to ¹ = F (¹).
There are several reasons for thinking this is useful. First, it is easy to see how the acceptability of money ¹ responds to changes in model parameters, like the severity of search frictions of the double coincidence problem. Also, since F can generally have more than one¯xed point, the model displays an economically interesting multiplicity: if agents believe money is accepted by a low fraction of the population they are not very inclined to accept it; but if they believe it will be accepted by a higher fraction they are more so inclined. That acceptability is endogenous and at least to some extent a self-ful¯lling prophecy has been a main theme in the search literature for some time. Simple search models do not display this phenomena, however, except in the extreme where money is either accepted or not, unless one takes seriously the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Hence, we think our model makes some compelling points that existing textbook versions cannot. On a technical note, we also think that out method for reducing equilibrium to a¯xed point of F is a contribution. Suppose that agents believe that individual i will accept money i® i 2 -for some subset of the population -. If they play best responses to this believes there will be a set that actually does accept money. So an equilibrium is generally ā xed point in set space. In any equilibrium of our model -= fij» i · ¹g and the problem reduces to¯nding a¯xed point of F , which is a number and not a set. Moreover, our assumptions are in a sense necessary for this result: with forms of heterogeneity other than those allowed here, we show there does not exist a variable » i such that equilibria necessarily have the form that -contains every i with » i below some threshold. 3
The Model
Time is continuous and agents live forever. The set of agents A has measure
1. There is a set of indivisible and perishable goods G, and di®erent agents produce and consume di®erent goods in this set. Assume i produces g i 2 G
and consumes goods in a subset
Agents meet bilaterally according to an anonymous random matching process with Poisson arrival rate ®. Suppose two agents i and j meet at random; then we assume
Hence, a double coincidence occurs with probability xy. Notice that agents are symmetric here in the sense that ®, x and y do not depend on agents' names; we argue below that while this is not necessary, in principle, it is important for tractability.
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We do allow heterogeneity in other dimensions. First, 8i 2 A, agent i derives utility u i > 0 from consuming any good in G i and disutility c i < u i from producing g i . Also, i has a rate of time preference r i and a storage cost °i for holding money, where money here is an indivisible object that agents cannot produce or consume but may help to facilitate trade. As is standard in the simplest search-based models, we assume that an individual can only store m 2 f0; 1g units of money. One can motivate the unit upper bound on money holdings by assuming that once i produces he cannot produce again until he consumes. 5 In any case, the fraction M 2 (0; 1) of the population with money are called buyers and the remaining 1 ¡ M are called sellers.
A given agent i 2 A is then fully described by his vector of characteristics
, with some arbitrary function ©(v i ) describing the distribution of characteristics over A. Let V i m denote the value function for agent i when he is holding m 2 f0; 1g units of money. Let m i denote the probability that agent i has money in steady state, and let ¼ i denote the probability that i accepts money if o®ered it in exchange. Then we have the standard continuous-time dynamic programming equations:
The¯rst term in (1) is the rate at which i when he is a seller meets an agent j who likes g i and has money, ®xm j , times the gain from taking the money in trade with probability ¼ i , integrated over A. The second term is the rate at which meets an agent j without money and they enjoy a double coincidence, ®xy(1 ¡ m j ), times the gain from a barter trade, also integrated over A. The¯rst term in (2) is the rate at which i when he is a buyer meets an agent j who has money and produces a good in G i , ®xm j , times the probability j takes the money, ¼ j , times the gain from trade, also integrated over A. The¯nal term is the disutility cost to i of storing money.
Notice we are using the fact that whether i wants to trade with j depends on v i but not v j { that is, your payo® in a trade depends on your type but not your partner's type. 6 . This means we can de¯ne
to be the set of agents who accept money (from everyone who has it). The best response condition for ¼ i is
We are interested in stationary equilibria where V i m and m i do not depend on time. The distribution of money holdings in this economy must satisfy the steady state conditions:
Rearrange this as
where M is the total money supply and ¹ = ¹ (-) = R -dj is the measure of the population that accepts money { or, equivalently, ¹ = E¼ i . Hence, according to (5), every i 2 -ends up holding money with the same probability in steady state.
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A special case of our setup is the standard model with homogenous agents.
In this version of the model, ¼ is the (mixed strategy) probability the representative agent accepts money. It is then easy to see that there will be some some reason make a mistake and, e.g., accept money with probability ¼ ¤ + ", for any " > 0, the best response jumps from
One can also show the mixed-strategy equilibrium is unstable in the evolutionary sense, and that with divisible goods or divisible money, or even with indivisible goods and money but agents who can trade lotteries, it cannot exist (see the references in the Introduction). Moreover, one would like to ask how acceptability responds to parameter changes; but here, in the purestrategy equilibria it simply does not, and in the mixed-strategy equilibrium it does respond but goes the \wrong way" (obviously because it is unstable).
Finally, while it is true the model illustrates that acceptability is to some extent a self-ful¯lling prophecy, in the sense that there can be multiple equilibria, there can never be multiple interior equilibria with di®erent degrees of partial acceptability. For all these reasons we pursue the heterogeneous agent case.
To characterize the set of agents who accept money -in our model, we
Hence, i 2 -if and only if ¢ i¸0 if and only if » i · ¹, where 8
is a statistic that depends on only on exogenous parameters and the vector of characteristics for i, v i = (u i ; c i ; r i ;°i). The distribution of » i across agents, F (» i ), can be derived from the underlying distribution of exogenous characteristics ©(v i ).
Finally, we close the model by observing that since -= fij» i · ¹g the measure of -in equilibrium is simply the fraction of agents with » i below the threshold ¹; that is, ¹ = F (¹). Any equilibrium is therefore a¯xed point ¹ 2 [0; 1] of F . Note that this depends on the threshold property of equilibria. We were able to construct a variable » i from primitives such that any equilibrium has the property that ¼ i = 1 i® » i is below some threshold.
This property in turn depends critically on the type of heterogeneity one assumes. More generally, an equilibrium is a¯xed point -in set space and, as we shall see below, for types of heterogeneity other than the type we allow there is generally no way to reduce things to a¯xed point problem in R 1 .
So far we have only shown that any equilibrium has the threshold property, which says nothing about existence. To this end, note the following. 
See any standard reference on¯xed point theorems.
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Of course in monetary economies we usually want more: like, the existence of a monetary equilibrium, where ¹ > 0. One way to get this is tō nd conditions that rule out the nonmonetary equilibrium { i.e. that imply F (0) > 0. This is not possible when°i¸0 8i 2 A: in this case, (7) implies » i > 0 8i 2 A, and therefore F (0) = 0. Naturally, in this case, if agents believe -= ; then it is an equilibrium for no one to take money. However, we can set°i < 0 { a negative storage cost corresponding to money paying a positive dividend. Notice that
For any agent i such that (8) holds, ¼ i = 1 is a dominant strategy. There is only one more detail to consider. If ¡°i is too large, an agent with money may not be willing to part with it. To be sure that he is willing we need to
We can impose (9) and still satisfy (8) as long as u i > c i . Hence, we can always assume the set (9) and (8) holdg (10) 9 Although we do not need continuity for existence, interesting things can happen when F is not continuous. For example, suppose
There still exists a¯xed point ¹ 6 = ¹ ¹ by the above argument, but in addition we can construct equilibrium around ¹ ¹ as follows. Every agent with » i < ¹ ¹ sets ¼ i = 1, every agent with » i > ¹ ¹ sets ¼ i = 0, and the mass of agents with » i = ¹ ¹ use a mixed strategy where ¼ i = 1 with probability ¼ and ¼ i = 0 with probability 1¡ ¼, where ¼ is determined so that ¢ i = 0 for » i = ¹ ¹. Of course, this is just the method for constructing mixed-strategy equilibria in a model with homogeneous agents.
has positive measure, which implies F (0) > 0, and therefore the equilibrium that we know exists must be a monetary equilibrium.
Figure 1: Some Possible Outcomes
It is clear that we can easily have multiple equilibria in the model. Figure   1 shows several possible outcomes. Three of the panels depict a unique¯xed point: a nonmonetary equilibrium ¹ = 0; a fully monetized equilibrium ¹ = 1; and a partially monetized equilibrium ¹ 2 (0; 1). The other panel depicts a case of multiple equilibria, one each of these three types. Obviously, we can also have multiple partially monetized equilibria with di®erent degrees of acceptability in this model { something the model with homogeneous agents cannot deliver. The intuition is standard: the net bene¯t to accepting money ¢ i is increasing in ¹, because the greater the degree to which the economy is monetized the easier it is to¯nd a seller who takes cash.
Just like we can assume A 0 has positive measure to guarantee F (0) > 0, we can also assume the set A 1 has positive measure to guarantee F (1) < 1,
where We now argue that the type of heterogeneity we consider is in some sense the most general that works. The key feature is that our vector v i = (u i ; c i ; r i ;°i) depends on i but not on other types. This is a special case since we could have also assumed, for example, that the utility of consumption depends on the identities of the consumer i and the producer j, say u ij . The same thing is true for the cost c ij . Also, the arrival rate ® ij could index the rate at which type i meets type j; indeed matching technologies like this have been used in the literature on international currency going back to Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993) . Additionally, the single-and double-coincidence probabilities could depend on both agents in a meeting, x ij and y ij .
While these types of heterogeneity are certainly not without interest, in their presence the model is much less tractable. The reason is that we lose the threshold property of equilibrium: it is no longer the case that we can construct a statistic » i such that all equilibria have property that the set of agents who accept money is equal to the set with » i below some threshold.
Without this property there is much less structure on the possible outcomes.
If agents believe ¼ j = 1 8j 2 -where -½ A is an arbitrary set, then each individual i will choose a best response ¼ i , which generates a set -0 = T (-) = fi 2 Aj¼ i = 1 is a best response given -g. An equilibrium is a¯xed point in set space, -= T (-), which is of course a much more complicated object than what we have above. 
where ® ¿ ®. This simply says that two agents are much more likely to meet if they belong to the same subset A k than if they belong to di®erent subsets. To illustrate the point, assume ® ¼ 0. Then the economy is really three sub-economies that do not interact.
These three sub-economies are each like our base model, and hence have the same type of possible equilibria. Suppose parameters are such that the situation for each sub-economy looks like the panel in Figure 1 with three equilibria, ¹ = 0, ¹ = 1, and ¹ = ¹ ¤ 2 (0; 1). We can assign each subeconomy a di®erent equilibrium in many possible ways. One natural possibility is the following: ¼ i = 1 8i 2 A 1 ; ¼ i = 1 i®°i is below the relevant threshold°¤ 8i 2 A 2 ; and ¼ i = 0 8i 2 A 1 . In this case it is true that -= fi 2 Aj°i <°¤g, so that agents with lower storage costs are more likely to accept money and one can say that a threshold result obtains. But we could also do the opposite and set ¼ i = 0 8i 2 A 1 ; ¼ i = 1 i®°i is below°¤ 8i 2 A 2 ; and ¼ i = 1 8i 2 A 1 .
Or we could set ¼ i = 1 8i 2 A 1 ; ¼ i = 0 8i 2 A 2 ; and ¼ i = 1 8i 2 A 1 .
There is clearly no way to rank agents in this example according to some number » i in such a way that all equilibria have the property that ¼ i = 1 i® » i is below a threshold. Hence, an equilibrium generally will be a¯xed point in set space -= T (-), as described above. While the example perhaps appears special because of the extreme assumption ® ¼ 0, the point is nevertheless general (similar results can be derived in examples where ® > 0). Again, we think this is interesting, but the goal here was to construct a tractable model.
Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to construct a simple model of money that displays robust equilibria with di®erent degrees of acceptability. 
